The Kona-Fulani Conflicts in Jalingo – Ardo Kola Communities: Current Perceptions for Each Other; Its Implication for Interreligious Coexistence 2020-2025

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Abstract

The Kona–Fulani disputes between the Jalingo and Ardo Kola villages of Taraba State exemplify a critical aspect of farmer–herder violence in Nigeria, with extensive repercussions for community stability and interreligious cohabitation. This research investigates the characteristics of disputes occurring between 2020 and 2025, emphasising the reciprocal perspectives of the Kona agricultural communities and Fulani pastoralists, and the influence of these beliefs on Christian–Muslim interactions within the study region. Utilising a qualitative research approach, the study depends on primary and secondary data sourced from academic literature, government papers, media outlets, and peacebuilding documents,

augmented by a contextual analysis of local conflict dynamics. The results show that the Kona–Fulani conflict is mostly caused by rivalry over land and jobs, but it has gotten much worse because of bad feelings, old grudges, environmental stress, and insufficient responses from institutions. The Kona see the Fulani as risks to their agricultural livelihoods, community safety, and Christian identity. The Fulani, on the other hand, see the Kona and state institutions as unfriendly, exclusive, and biassed against pastoral livelihoods and a threat to the Fulani throne. These views have made people of different religions and ethnicities less trusting of each other, made social bonds weaker, and made it harder for people of different religions to live together peacefully in the Jalingo–Ardo Kola villages. The study indicates that sustaining peace necessitates more than security-oriented measures; it involves perception-altering tactics, inclusive land-use governance, and ongoing interreligious discourse. The research adds to academic discussions on conflicts between farmers and herders and gives policymakers useful information about how to promote peace and bring people of different faiths together in Taraba State and other places in Nigeria where there are many different religions.

Keywords: Kona–Fulani, conflict, Farmer–herder, Interreligious coexistence, Perception and identity and Peacebuilding.

Introduction

The ongoing fights between Kona agricultural communities and Fulani pastoralists in Taraba State's Jalingo and Ardo Kola Local Government Areas are one of the longest-lasting examples of farmer-herder violence in Nigeria. There have been fights between these groups before 2020, but tensions have risen again between 2020 and 2025 because of population growth, environmental stress, insufficient conflict-management systems, and more extreme interpretations of violence based on ethnicity and religion. These battles have greatly transformed the perceptions of the Kona and Fulani towards one other, resulting in important implications for

interreligious cooperation, especially between Christianity and Islam among the impacted communities.

Nobri, Keibai, and Notani say that Historically, the Kona people have mostly been sedentary farmers who depend on fertile land for crop cultivation to survive. The Fulani, on the other hand, are mostly nomadic or semi-nomadic herders who depend on open grazing and seasonal migration for their livelihoods (Personal Communication 03-01-2026). Nigerian scholars have extensively recognised this structural conflict in land usage as the principal catalyst for persistent violence in Taraba State (Alubo, 2018; Ochonu, 2021). The lack of clearly marked grazing paths and the fast growth of cropland in the Jalingo–Ardo Kola area have made competition stronger, making conflict nearly certain (Ishaya & Ande, 2022).

From 2020 to 2025, climate change and environmental degradation made these material conflicts much worse by making less grazing and water resources accessible. Research in Taraba State reveals that extended dry seasons and erratic rainfall patterns have compelled Fulani herders to relocate cattle nearer to agricultural villages, hence escalating the frequency of crop devastation and violent reprisals (Ahmed & Yusuf, 2023). Consequently, environmental scarcity has functioned as a conflict multiplier, converting ordinary conflicts into enduring communal bloodshed.

In addition to economic and ecological considerations, the Kona–Fulani disputes have progressively taken on ethno-religious dimensions. The Kona villages are mostly Christian, while the Fulani are mostly Muslim. This difference has made what are really land-based disputes seem like religious ones. Kukah (2020) asserts that conflicts in Nigeria frequently become "religionised," not due to religion being the fundamental cause, but because religious identity serves as a potent framework for communities to interpret violence, allocate responsibility, and galvanise resistance. This situation has led to stories of collective victimhood on both sides in Jalingo and Ardo Kola.

In the Kona community, the Fulani are seen as outside aggressors that endanger their ancestral lands, food security, and the existence of their community. Field

studies in Taraba State indicate that some Kona farmers perceive Fulani invasions not just as economic intrusions but as intentional efforts at subjugation, occasionally associated—accurately or inaccurately—with overarching anxieties of 'Islamisation' (Tukur, 2022). These kinds of thoughts have made people more defensive and, in some circumstances, made them feel like they had to fight back. On the other hand, Fulani communities typically see the Kona and state institutions as antagonistic and unwelcoming. They accuse local authorities of being biassed, giving selective justice, and not doing enough to safeguard pastoral livelihoods (Blench, 2021; Musa, 2023). These reciprocal suspicions have solidified cycles of violence and hostility.

Notani, Anthony, and Vengkani assert that the ramifications of these attitudes for interreligious tolerance are significant. Repeated confrontations have made it harder for people to get along, marry each other, share marketplaces, and be tolerant of other religions. Churches and mosques in war-affected regions have sometimes emerged as symbols in narratives of conflict, even when they are not explicitly targeted (Personal Communication 20-12-2025). Scholars observe that when economic disputes acquire religious significance, reconciliation is become more challenging, as complaints transform into moral and spiritual injustices rather than negotiable financial claims (Gofwen, 2019). This situation presents significant obstacles to Christian-Muslim interactions in the Jalingo-Ardo Kola communities.

Yusuf, Ahmad, John, and the Taraba State Ministry of Information all agree that the government's peace talks, military-mediated reconciliations, and community awareness programs from 2020 to 2025 have had mixed results (Personal Communication 01-01-2026). Some measures have temporarily decreased large-scale violence, but they frequently do not deal with the deep-seated beliefs and religious distrust that keep enmity going. Nigerian peace researchers contend that in the absence of intentional interreligious discussion and comprehensive land-use changes, peace initiatives may remain cosmetic (Onapajo & Usman, 2021). It is both important and vital to look at how the Kona and Fulani see each other now and what that means for people of different religions living together. This investigation enhances scholarly discussions regarding farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria and

informs policy and faith-based peacebuilding efforts designed to promote sustainable coexistence in Taraba State.

Conceptual Clarification: Farmer–Herder Conflict and Interreligious Coexistence

Farmer–herder conflict occurs when stationary farming groups and nomadic or semi-mobile pastoralists fight over land, water, and other natural resources. These fights can be violent or not (Blench, 2021). In Nigeria, these conflicts never remain only within the realm of economic issues; they frequently intertwine with ethnicity, religion, and identity politics. Interreligious coexistence refers to the ability of followers of diverse religious traditions, specifically Christianity and Islam within the Nigerian setting, to coexist together via mutual respect, discourse, and common social structures (Kukah, 2020).

The Kona–Fulani conflict in Jalingo–Ardo Kola illustrates how unresolved grievances can lead to ethno-religious conflicts in property disputes. This research employs a comprehensive framework that perceives conflict as a complex occurrence influenced by material, social, and religious elements.

Socioeconomic Factors Contributing to the Kona–Fulani Conflicts

Competition for land use and job security

Notani, Anthony, and Vengkani assert that the principal catalyst of the Kona–Fulani conflict is rivalry for land. Kona populations rely nearly entirely on farming for food and money, whereas Fulani pastoralists rely on large grazing systems (Personal Communication 06-01-2026). The growth of farmlands near Jalingo and Ardo Kola has made traditional grazing lanes smaller, which has forced livestock into cultivated areas and caused arguments (Ishaya & Ande, 2022). From 2020 to 2025, the population grew and cities near Jalingo grew, which made land more scarcer. As farms took over traditional cow pathways, agricultural devastation happened more often, which led to violence in response. These fights hurt the economies of both groups, making them poorer and more hostile (Ahmed & Yusuf, 2023).

Stress on the environment and changes in the climate

Desertification, soil deterioration, and unpredictable rainfall patterns are some of the environmental variables that have made it easier for pastoralists to move into farming areas. Climate change has made pastures less available in northern grazing areas, which has forced Fulani herders to move south into Taraba State (Blench, 2021). This environmental stress has made things worse in Jalingo–Ardo Kola, turning short-term fights into long-term wars.

How the Kona and Fulani Communities See Each Other

Kona Views of the Fulani in the Jalingo–Ardo Kola Communities

Historical Retention and the Development of Perception

The Kona people's views of Fulani pastoralists in Jalingo–Ardo Kola are strongly rooted in their shared historical memory, which has been influenced by recurrent interactions that were tense, violent, and left unsolved issues. Oral narratives in Kona villages frequently recount past instances of land invasion, agricultural devastation, and violent confrontations, perpetuated through generations and bolstered by current events (Alubo, 2018; Ochonu, 2021). These recollections operate as interpretative frameworks for understanding current Fulani operations, sometimes leading Kona farmers to be suspicious and protective.

Gofwen (2019) says that the "normalisation of fear" has happened because of a long history of warfare. This means that communities see even normal pastoral movements as possible dangers. As a result, the Fulani's presence on or near Kona farmlands is not seen as an accident or something that can be worked out, but as something that is planned and hostile. This view makes it much harder to find peaceful ways to settle differences and leads to preemptive resistance. Perception of Livelihood Threat and Economic Anxiety

Kona's impressions of the Fulani are heavily influenced by the instability of their livelihoods. Farming is still the Kona's major source of income, and any interruption to it, especially when cattle destroy crops, is seen as a direct threat to the livelihood of the home and the health of the community. Research in Taraba State regularly indicates that farmers regard Fulani herders as the foremost danger to food security in rural areas (Ishaya & Ande, 2022; Dabo et al., 2024).

From 2020 to 2025, increased prices, less fertile land, and changing weather made Kona farmers more worried about their finances. In this setting, occurrences involving Fulani cattle were perceived not as isolated disagreements but as components of a larger pattern of existential threat. Ahmed and Yusuf (2023) contend that economic weakness amplifies emotional reactions and entrenches unfavourable beliefs, hence complicating the pursuit of compromise.

How people see violence, crime, and danger

Another key part of how Kona people see things is their view of Fulani pastoralists as violent and dangerous. Media accounts, community testimonials, and academic research reveal that numerous people of Kona erroneously or without substantiation associate occurrences of armed assaults, nocturnal incursions, and rural banditry with Fulani gangs (Independent Newspaper Nigeria, 2019; Lucas et al., 2023).

While actual research indicates that criminal violence in Taraba State encompasses several participants, including bandits and community militias, Kona narratives frequently combine Fulani identity with violent aggressiveness. This belief is strengthened when those who commit violence are said to speak Fulfulde or wear clothes that are typical of pastoralists. These kinds of connections lead to collective guilt, which means that peaceful Fulani pastoralists are seen as suspicious no matter how they act (Blench, 2021).

Ethno-Religious Framing of the Conflict

Religion is a big part of how Kona people see the Fulani. The Fulani are mostly Muslim, whereas the Kona are mostly Christian. This theological difference creates a strong symbolic line that turns dispute over resources into what looks like a fight between Christians and Muslims. Kukah (2020) asserts that in instances of religiously motivated conflicts, economic concerns are frequently moralised and sanctified.

In Jalingo–Ardo Kola, Kona Christians may interpret Fulani behaviour via expansive national narratives that depict herder–farmer disputes as components of a purported strategy for Islamic expansion or hegemony. Although these

interpretations lack empirical support, they gain prominence in contexts marked by recurrent violence and inadequate governmental protection (Onapajo & Usman, 2021). Because of this, Fulani pastoralists are seen as both economic rivals and religious and cultural "others."

Distrust of State Institutions and Perceived Prejudice

Ayauleimam Kona says that people's views of the Fulani are also affected by their great distrust of government institutions, especially security services and the courts. Many Kona farmers think that Fulani people who commit violence get away with it because they are politically powerful, ethnically united, or think they are protected by the federal government (Personal communication, 03/01/2026). This idea strengthens stories that show Fulani pastoralists as having special rights and not being held accountable.

These kinds of ideas about institutional bias have big effects. When people in Kona lose trust in formal ways to settle disputes, they are more inclined to accept vigilante justice and self-defence by the community. Researchers contend that this dynamic perpetuates cycles of violence and legitimises retaliatory responses, even when these measures compromise enduring peace (Gofwen, 2019; Musa, 2023).

Stereotyping, Social Distance, and Dehumanisation

Long-lasting warfare has caused strong prejudices about Fulani pastoralists to form in Kona communities. People often say the Fulani are aggressive, stubborn, and don't get along with farming communities. Tari (2025) notes that these kinds of stereotypes are widespread in confrontations between farmers and herders in central Nigeria, and they help people feel justified in their exclusionary attitudes and actions.

These prejudices make the gap between the two groups bigger. Everyday encounters, including going to the same markets, social events, and casual bargaining, have gone down a lot. In certain Kona neighbourhoods, people stay away from Fulani, which makes segregation and lack of understanding even worse. This process may dehumanise the "other" over time, rendering violence more socially acceptable in times of crisis.

Perceptual Implications for Interreligious Coexistence

The whole impact of these views is a big problem for people of different religions living together in Jalingo–Ardo Kola. Churches and Christian leaders are typically the places where people voice their complaints, whereas mosques and Islamic authorities are seen with distrust. Religious organisations have sometimes helped bring about peace, but their usefulness is limited by the fact that most people have negative views of them (Lucas et al., 2023).

When people see Fulani pastoralists as economic threats, violent actors, religious outsiders, and people who benefit from governmental prejudice all at the same time, it becomes less likely that they will be able to live together peacefully. Onapajo and Usman (2021) contend that enduring peace in these situations necessitates not just structural improvements but also intentional initiatives to alter views via discourse, interfaith participation, and inclusive government.

Fulani Perceptions of the Kona and the State in Jalingo–Ardo Kola Communities

1. Historical Experience and the Perception of Marginalisation

Umaru and Bala believe that the Fulani's views of the Kona and the Nigerian state in Jalingo–Ardo Kola are heavily influenced by their past experiences of being left out, pushed to the side, and politically weak. The Fulani, being primarily pastoral populations, frequently saw themselves as minorities inside agrarian-centric local government frameworks, where decision-making authority is mostly held by sedentary agricultural collectives like the Kona (Personal communication 06-01-2026). This institutional mismatch has led to a long-lasting feeling of being politically and socially invisible.

From the Fulani's point of view, the ongoing confrontations are not only fights with Kona farmers; they are signs of a larger system that doesn't see pastoral lifestyles as acceptable. Ochonu (2021) observes that numerous Fulani perceive local opposition to grazing as indicative of intentional attempts to displace them off traditional transhumance pathways, exacerbating sentiments of dispossession and estrangement.

2. How people see the Kona as hostile and intolerant people Fulani pastoralists sometimes view Kona farmers as intolerant, hostile, and resistant to accommodating pastoral lifestyles. Fulani respondents in interviews and qualitative research throughout Taraba State recount incidents of harassment, livestock rustling, damage of watering stations, and physical assaults on herders (Musa, 2023). These kinds of experiences lead people to believe that Kona communities start fights on purpose while pretending to be victims in public stories.

Fulani elders say that collective punishment, when whole pastoral villages are punished for the misdeeds of a few people, makes this idea even stronger. Blench (2021) contends that this dynamic causes Fulani tribes to perceive agricultural communities as antagonistic entities rather as prospective collaborators in cohabitation, thereby diminishing incentives for peaceful interaction.

3. The perception of criminalisation and stereotyping of Fulani identity. A fundamental aspect of Fulani view is the conviction that their identity has been criminalised and securitised. Fulani pastoralists frequently assert that they are unjustly linked to banditry, terrorism, and armed violence, irrespective of their actual participation in criminal endeavours (Onapajo & Usman, 2021). They claim that this stereotyping has made draconian security measures, vigilante violence, and unfair policies okay.

In Jalingo–Ardo Kola, Fulani respondents often assert that security personnel regard them as suspects rather than victims, especially during collaborative military operations or community raids (Tukur, 2022). This experience fosters the belief that the state fails to differentiate between peaceful pastoralists and criminal groups, thereby eroding faith in law enforcement organisations.

4. Views on State Bias and Selective Justice

Fulani views of the Nigerian government are marked by a lot of suspicion and claims of unfair justice. Many pastoralists say that the government's reactions to disputes mostly help farming groups. For example, Fulani suspects are rapidly detained, while attacks on herders or livestock theft generally go uninvestigated

(Musa, 2023). This apparent disparity breeds animosity and strengthens the idea that formal legal systems can't bring justice to pastoral groups. Fulani groups also see anti-open grazing ordinances and municipal land-use rules as unfair tools meant to hurt pastoralism. Governments defend these regulations by saying they are good for the environment and safety, but Fulani communities frequently see them as a ploy to make their way of life illegal without giving them any other options (Blench, 2021; Ahmed & Yusuf, 2023).

5. Religious Identity and Perceived Cultural Exclusion

Religion is a big part in how Fulani people see things. Fulani pastoralists frequently feel culturally and religiously alone since they live in mostly Christian farmed regions yet are mostly Muslim. Kukah (2020) notes that religious differences, while not the primary source of farmer–herder conflict, exacerbate emotions of exclusion during community violence.

In Jalingo–Ardo Kola, Fulani Muslims may see Kona opposition as indicative of widespread Christian animosity against Islam, especially when churches serve as focal sites for community mobilisation. These kinds of interpretations make people less trusting of each other's religions and make them think that pastoral and farming groups can't get along.

6. Ways to deal with problems and stay away from government structures because they think the Kona and the state are hostile, many Fulani pastoralists use coping mechanisms that keep them even further away from official governing systems. These consist of self-isolation, dependence on ethnic solidarity networks, and evasion of governmental institutions including courts and police stations (Musa, 2023). These techniques provide temporary security but compromise long-term integration and harmonious cohabitation. Researchers contend that this disengagement exacerbates cycles of misunderstanding and violence, since the lack of pastoral representation in conflict-resolution forums sustains stereotypes and policy marginalisation (Onapajo & Usman, 2021).

Implications for Interreligious and Communal Coexistence

Fulani sentiments of antagonism, marginalisation, and state prejudice profoundly affect interreligious harmony in Jalingo–Ardo Kola. When pastoralists see farming communities and government institutions as enemies, they are less inclined to talk to each other or trust peace efforts. This makes it harder for people of different faiths to work along and makes violence more likely.

For peace to last, we need to deal with not only the Fulani pastoralists' tangible complaints, but also how they feel about being treated unfairly and left out. To re-establish trust and promote peace, it is important to have open government, impartial law enforcement, and conversations between people of different religions.

Religious Aspects of the Kona–Fulani Conflicts

The Kona–Fulani conflict is primarily based on disputes over land and livelihoods, however religion significantly influences its interpretation. The Fulani are mostly Muslim, whereas the Kona are mostly Christian. This theological distinction has enabled the characterisation of hostilities as Christian–Muslim clashes, particularly during times of increased violence.

Scholars contend that religion, in these situations, serves as a mobilising identity rather than a theological catalyst for conflict (Gofwen, 2019). In Jalingo–Ardo Kola, religious leaders have occasionally facilitated the alleviation of tensions, while at other times, religious discourse has exacerbated community divisions. When problems are described in religious terms, it becomes harder to find a middle ground because the complaints take on moral and spiritual meaning. Consequences for Interreligious Coexistence

Violence that keeps happening has made Christians and Muslims less trusting of one other. Markets, schools, and community events are become places of distrust instead of collaboration. Interfaith relationships have diminished, undermining societal cohesiveness.

Effects on Religious Institutions

Churches and mosques, while not always direct targets, have evolved into symbolic markers within the war narrative. Fear of assault has made people less likely to go to religious services and work together with people of other faiths, which goes against the traditional function of religious organisations as peacemakers (Kukah, 2020).

Long-Term Effects on Peacebuilding

The ongoing decline of interreligious ties jeopardises enduring peace in Jalingo–Ardo Kola. If there aren't any planned efforts to bring people together that deal with both economic problems and religious distrust, confrontations are likely to happen again, and the effects on community living will get worse.

Efforts to manage conflict and build peace (2020–2025)

State and non-state actors have used many ways to deal with the Kona–Fulani dispute, including as peace talks, security interventions, and programs to raise awareness in the community. Dialogues mediated by the military and government peace committees have resulted in temporary tranquilly but have faced challenges in tackling underlying issues such as land administration and religious distrust (Taraba State Ministry of Information, 2024). Scholars assert that enduring peace necessitates broad discourse that encompasses traditional leaders, religious figures, women, and youth, in conjunction with improvements in land-use legislation and pastoral management systems (Onapajo & Usman, 2021).

Conclusion

This study investigated the Kona–Fulani disputes among the Jalingo–Ardo Kola communities, focussing on contemporary mutual perspectives and their ramifications for interreligious cooperation from 2020 to 2025. The findings indicate that while the conflict is primarily based on competition for land and livelihoods, it has been considerably exacerbated by adverse attitudes, historical grudges, and ethno-religious interpretations. The research demonstrated that the Kona view the Fulani predominantly as foreign aggressors posing threats to agricultural livelihoods, communal security, and Christian identity. These views are strengthened by recurrent experiences of agricultural damage, instability, and the

belief that the government is not doing enough to help. On the other hand, the Fulani see the Kona and the state as antagonistic, exclusive, and unfair to pastoral lifestyles. Feelings of being pushed to the side, being treated like a criminal, and not getting fair treatment have made the Fulani pull out of official government and peacebuilding efforts.

Significantly, the study determines that religion serves primarily as an interpretative and mobilising force rather as a theological catalyst of the conflict. The religious identities of the Kona (mostly Christian) and the Fulani (mostly Muslim) have made it harder to bring people together and made people less trusting of each other. The endurance of these perceptions has compromised interreligious cohabitation, diminished societal cohesiveness, and diminished the efficacy of peace attempts in Jalingo–Ardo Kola.

The study shows that security measures alone cannot bring about long-lasting peace. The Kona–Fulani dispute will probably happen again if people don't work hard to change how they see things, encourage inclusive government, and fix the structural inequities in land usage and pastoral management. This will have worse effects for interreligious peace and community stability.

Recommendations

The study's findings lead to the following suggestions:

1. Institutionalised Dialogue Between Religions

Permanent interreligious discussion platforms must be established at the community and local government levels, incorporating Christian and Muslim leaders from both the Kona and Fulani populations. These kinds of platforms should go beyond just having symbolic gatherings and instead focus on developing trust, preventing conflicts, and working together to solve problems.

2. Changes to the land use and grazing policy that include everyone

The administration of Taraba State should draft and put into action land-use policies that include both farming and pastoral livelihoods. To ease conflicts over resources, there need to be clearly defined grazing lanes, agreed-upon access to

water spots, and community-based land management committees with members from both the Kona and Fulani groups.

2. Making traditional and community-based ways of settling conflicts stronger

Traditional rulers, community elders, and local peace committees should be given the power and legal recognition to be the first people to respond to conflicts. To be fair and legitimate, these systems should have both ethnic and religious representation.

3. Security and justice systems that are fair and unbiased

When dealing with disputes, security forces need to be fair and sympathetic to the needs of the community. To repair confidence between the Kona and Fulani populations, allegations of selective justice should be looked upon and people should be held accountable.

5. Programs for Peace Education and Changing People's Minds

Faith-based groups and civil society groups should start programs that teach peace and change people's perceptions in order to fight stereotypes, hate speech, and promote understanding. These kinds of programs should be aimed at young people, who are frequently the most active during violent events.

6. Help with jobs and economic empowerment

To lessen economic competition and encourage interdependence between the Kona and Fulani populations, joint economic ventures such cooperative agricultural and pastoral operations, common marketplaces, and vocational training should be encouraged.

7. Media Responsibility and Reporting That Is Sensitive to Conflict

To minimise sensationalism and religious stereotyping, media companies in Taraba State should be taught how to do conflict-sensitive journalism. Balanced reporting may be quite important for making people feel good about things and lowering tensions.

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Appendix A
LIST OF INFORMANTS

S/N	NAME	GENDER	AGE	OCCUPATION	L.G. A	DATE
1	Aveukani Nobinu	Female	40	Applicant	Jalingo – Ardo-kola	20/12/2025
2	Avaukurumam Nobri	Male	45	Business	Jalingo – Ardo-kola	20/12/2025
3	Alhassan Umaru	Male	49	Business	Jalingo – Ardo-kola	20/12/2025
4	Annuzinang Keibai	Male	58	Applicant	Jalingo – Ardo-kola	06/01/2026
5	Sanusi Bala	Male	50	Civil Servant	Jalingo – Ardo-kola	06/01/2026
6	Susan Bamang Peter	Female	40	Civil Servant	Jalingo – Ardo-kola	06/01/2026
7	Ayaukani Vengkani	Female	53	Business	Jalingo – Ardo-kola	03/01/2026
8	Haruna maimayi	Male	40	Applicant	Jalingo – Ardo-kola	06/01/2026
9	Nobinu Ayauleimam	Male	30	Civil Servant	Jalingo – Ardo-kola	03/01/2026
10	Noku Nomiri Ado	Male	50	Civil Servant	Jalingo – Ardo-kola	03/01/2026