# The United Nations and Conflict Resolutions in Africa: The Rwandan Experience.

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## Abstract

This study is an examination of the United Nations conflict resolution in Africa with particular reference to Rwanda. Its analysis is premised on both the remote and immediate causes of the conflict. The research evaluates the responses of the United Nations, and the efficacy of the conflict resolution mechanisms employed therein such as the use of peace keeping and other mediating efforts evident in the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, the authorization of humanitarian operations during the war, and the establishment of the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for the purposes of the prosecution, conviction and punishment of perpetrators of genocide and other crimes against humanity. The research concludes on the fact that despite the mechanisms adopted by the United Nations against the genocide background, the United Nations absolutely failed Rwanda when they were needed most. Nevertheless, only a juridical method was favorably efficacious in resolving the conflict in Rwanda evident in the post genocide effort of the United Nations to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda which also was not without its own deficiencies arising from the one-sided judgment of the tribunal. However, the research undertook a historical evaluation of the remote and immediate causes of the conflict with recurs to the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial factors that necessitated the ignition of actual genocide in 1994.It is recommended that the United Nations should maintain leadership position in international conflict resolution despite recent

political and academic criticisms regarding outcomes of its operations. Although number of multinational and state actors like African Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, United State, and others leading peacekeeping and peace building missions increased appreciably, UN still plays most critical part in resolving global based conflict. Most of these peace keeping missions are under serious criticism because it was believed that they failed short of expectations. And the work did conclude by drawing lessons from the experience which enabled the formation of specific recommendations for Rwanda and future complex emergencies.

## Introduction

The United Nation (UN) was established in 1945 basically with global understanding and consciousness on the need to maintain and sustain peace and security at the global level, this consciences and understanding followed after the failure of the League of Nations and resultant World War II. The UN charter is the source of authority through the Security Council to conduct the entire UN and regional based Peace Support functions (Boroh, 2013). The UN was born out of war, and so its founders were conscious of avoiding wars and protect individuals globally. The role of UN peace keeping came out of the willingness of international society to resolve conflicts and war situations globally.

In Rwanda, the United Nations Security Council set up the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993 to ensure national reconciliation. But the peace efforts were halted in April 6, 1994 when the plane carrying President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryemira of Burundi was shot down on its way to Kigali airport. This act of assassination triggered Rwandan genocide which saw over 500,000 Tutsis and some Hutus killed in barely one month. The genocide ended when Rwandan Peoples Front (RPF) marched into Kigali and overthrew the government. The1994 Rwandan conflict became history on the largest rate of mass murder. Between April and June, over 800,000 people, about 10% of Rwandan population were killed in continual killing which lasted for barely 100 days (Destexhe,1994).The IMF and World Bank via "National Institute of Statistics" for Rwanda (NISR), reported that Rwandan demography in 1990 stood at 7.1 million, and by 1994 it

dropped to 5.5 million, and latter grew drastically to 9.6 million in year 2008 (IMF and World Bank report, retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/ida).

Failure or inability of United Nations (UN) to promptly respond and forestall the alarming genocide situations in Rwanda gave way for the eventual occurrence of the genocide. The unwillingness of individual nations like US, Belgium and France to intervene and prevent Rwandan genocide equally contributed to prolonging the crisis.

Understanding that Rwandan conflict has objective basis in the society, it becomes obvious that operational strategy or technique employed by UN aimed at conflict resolution in Rwanda was a failure and non-efficacious.

**Theoretical Framework**

Conflict theory is used in explain different social phenomena like revolution, wars, wealth and poverty discrimination and domestic violence. It ascribes majority of fundamental developments in human history like democracy, civil rights, and imperialistic interest to control people instead of the need for social order. This theory is concern mostly on social inequality as regards resources sharing and focuses basically on conflict which arises between people of different class. It lays major emphasis on position of coercion and power in creating needed social order because human society is separated into groups who compete for economic resources and social status.

The foundational theory of this work which is the conflict theory, maintains that because of societal continual competition for limited resources, it will continually be in perpetual conflict. The basis being that every society is separated based on class with relationship between them been asymmetric as those that possess wealth and power control it jealously from others while others without wealth or power will do all it takes to obtain them. This simple direct dynamics suggest the presence of continual struggle and conflict between the rich and the poor. Hence social order is sustain through domination and power instead of consensus and conformity. That is the reason why those in power with wealth try to hold on to it by any means chiefly by suppressing the poor and powerless.

This theory maintained that social phenomenon is understood through the lens that there is natural inbuilt instinct for conflict in human being. Marx never said that conflict is good or bad, but instead that it is an unavoidable aspect of human nature which explains why certain things happen the way they do. It further explains that there is a natural disparity in society which leads to conflict and ultimately war and other forms of injustice and discrimination.

The history of this theory is traced back to the time of thinkers like Machiavelli or Thomas Hobbes and they both saw human from cynical perspective. In its present state, the theory has radical basic presumptions, which is that the society is continually in conflict and this may explain social alterations. It favors those that have power or wealth and they struggle to keep this power and wealth whereas, it is detrimental to those who have little or not as they will struggle to increase their lot in life. To understand this theory one should know that competition between different social classes plays a significant role in societal advancement. Also, modern conflict theory is characterized by four basic major assumption namely, competition, structural inequality, revolution and war.

The Rwanda conflict is a typical experience on how violence ensued from some social conditions basically in the atmosphere of obvious marginalization. Historically Hutu were in Rwanda before the Tutsi. But civilization favored the Tutsi and place then at apex of the social strata to rule over their majority Hutu. This social division was strengthened by the colonial policies of clear cut ethnic identity which bred feelings of hatred and animosity before and after independence

From the pre-colonial period, the Tutsi were at the helm of affairs and are considered to constitute the upper class in the Rwandan social setting, while Hutu constitute the lower class not minding their population strength. The Tutsi were seen as the wealthy class with political power, hence, they tried to maintain their position to the detriment of their Hutu counterpart, while the Hutu in turn were desperately anxious to struggle for power through majority rule with view to change the socio-political structure of Rwanda. The struggle for change of power between Hutu and Tutsi became a reality at the verge of Rwandan independence.

The situation that brought about social change in Rwanda is a characteristic of the conflict theory (African Rights, 1995 A).

Furthermore, ethnic conflict progressed in post independent Rwanda. Tutsi refugees living in Tanzania and Zaire in effort to return and regain their former positions in Rwanda began organizing and staging incessant attacks on Hutu government and populace, while the Hutu-led government in a bid to sustain power and dominance, launched reprisal attacks against Tutsi which resulted to increased wave of refugees. The zealous ambition of Tutsi to reverse this socio-political structure led to their formation of Rwandan Patriotic Front(RPF) in 1988, the activities of this political and military organization caused the Hutu extremists and right-wing government officials to adopt genocide ideology and campaign which led to actual extermination of over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in massive massacre that lasted for over 100 days and devastated socio-political and economic landscape in Rwandan economy in 1994.

**Historical Evolution of the Rwandan Conflict**

Rwanda has a demography of over 7 million people, which, according to essentialist school of thought, is divided along three ethnic groups (Gasana, Jean-Bosco, Deo, Kareikezi, cited in Adedeji, 1999). The Hutu make up virtually 85 percent of population, while Tutsi make up 14 percent and Twa is composed of the remaining 1 percent. From the pre- colonial period, the Tutsi were at the peak of social strata in the Rwandan social setting while Hutu were relegated to a low class. Nevertheless some kind of social mobility existed, a situation where Hutu who acquires a large number of cattle or other wealth, could be assimilated into Tutsi group bearing certain social status and opportunities, while an impoverished Tutsi could be degraded to the status of a Hutu in the Rwandan society. There was also an existence of a clan functional system with the Tutsi clan known as Nyinginya meaning "most powerful". In the entire 1800s, Nyingiya increased their influence through conquest and giving protection in return for tribute as a result of their hegemonic status. Centuries of Hutu hatred toward elitist minority Tutsi made politics a tensed arena in Rwanda which later cumulated into ethnic massacre of Tutsi in 1994 and its aftermath effects. However, the different ethnic groups in Rwanda were in peace before the coming of Europeans despite their differences (African Rights, 1995 B).

The ideology of ethnic division and hatred precisely between Hutu and Tutsi was heightened by the colonial administrative policies which favored one group against the other by introducing an asymmetric power structure and class division. This unequal social structure that placed Tutsi at hem of affairs became a flash point and source of ethnic violence that later plunged Rwanda into genocide in 1994 were over 800,000 lives were lost in a massive massacre that lasted for barely 100 days (Anonymous, "*The Axworthy Agenda*").

**The Beginning of Ethnic Conflict**

Germany was the first European power to annex Rwanda and assert colonial influence upon the country. In early 20th century, Germany lost possession of Rwanda after the First World War, following the League of Nations mandate which placed Rwanda under Belgium administration. After Second World War, precisely in late 1950s, there emerged great wave of decolonization in Africa, the result of which induced drastic growth in a Hutu emancipation movement in Rwanda fueled by increased resentment of inter-war social reform and also increased sympathy for Hutu in Catholic Church (Prunier, 1999). Catholic missionaries through education policies and other measures empowered underprivileged Hutu instead of Tutsi elite, which led to a rapid formation of considerable size of Hutu clergy and elite to counterbalance the existing political order. The monarchy and prominent Tutsi sensed these increasing influence from Hutu and started agitating for independence on own terms. In 1957, some Hutu scholars wrote "Bahutu Manifesto". This was first report that stated equivocally that "Tutsi and Hutu" are two separate race and called for power transfer from Tutsi to Hutu based on what they called "statistical law" (Prunia, 1999).

On November 1st 1959, there was attack on a Hutu sub-chief in Kigali Dominic Mbonyumutwa by supporters of pro-Tutsi party. This attack sparked violent situation of Hutu uprising which saw numerous Tutsi killed and many displaced and forced into exile in neighboring nations and that marked beginning of "Hutu Peasant Revolution" or "Rwandan Revolution" lasting from 1959 to 1961, which signified end to Tutsi domination and increased ethnic pressure in Rwanda.

With full support from Belgian administration that intended to stop Tutsi domination, in early 1960, many Tutsi leaders were replaced by Hutu. The king

was terminated and Hutu dominated republic was created. By 1962, when Rwanda gained independence, nearly 120,000 people, mainly of Tutsi extraction are refugees in neighboring nation states of Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Cong-Zaire with reason of escaping from Hutu led violence which had accompanied gradual power shift to Hutu community.

New incidence of ethnic conflict and violence progressed in post-independent Rwanda. Tutsi refugees living in Tanzania and Zaire in effort to return and regain their former positions in Rwanda began planning and matting attacks on Hutu populace and government. They formed armed groups called INYENZI (cockroaches) and launched incessant attacks between 1962 and 1967, each leading to reprisal killings or counterattacks and new wave of refugees.

By late 1980s, virtually 480,000 Rwandans have been displaced to refugee camps in neighboring Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania. Pro-Hutu discrimination persisted in Rwanda, but that of violence against Tutsi decrease after 1973 coup that installed Juvenal Habyarimana as president.

It is inarguable to attribute the ethnic division and animosity which existed mainly between Hutu and Tutsi to one sided policies of colonial era and social situation that was created based on colonial interest. Even though there was a traditional socio-economic disparity between these groups, the colonial adoption of the Hermitic hypothesis gave the Tutsi edge of civilization over their Hutu counterpart placed socio-economic and political power in hands of Tutsi while Hutu were relegated, marginalized and treated with contempt from late 19$^{th}$ century to start of Hutu peasant revolution in 1959.

**The Civil War in Rwanda**

In 1988, Rwandan patriotic front (RPF) was formed in Kampala, Uganda as political and military movement saddled with objective of repatriating Rwandan refugees and restructuring of government and power distribution formula. In October 1990, Rwigyema commanded force of more than 4,000 rebel armed force from Uganda to Rwanda under the Rwanda patriotic front. He was killed on third day of their attack under concerted effort of France, Zaire and Rwandan army. His deputy, Paul Kagame, took command of the RPF forces which was composed

mainly of Tutsi who are exiles from Uganda, many of whom served under President Yoweri Museveni's that was overthrown by Uganda government of Milton Obote in 1986.

On October 1st 1990, the RPF staged attack from Uganda on Rwanda using a force of over 7,000 soldiers. Kagame resumed war in 1991, with surprise attack on Northern town of Rubengeri, and later incited incessant guerrilla war against Rwandan army. These attacks caused displacement of thousands as it induced policy of deliberately targeted propaganda by Rwandan government that every Tutsi inside Rwanda were part of RPF and Hutu people in opposed parties are equally labeled traitors. Also, media, precisely Radio, continually spread unfounded rumors that worsened ethnic pressure in Rwanda.

In October 1993, UN Security Council (UNSC) found "United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda" (UNAMIR) which arrived in Rwanda with mandate of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and to give general support for process and implementation of "Arusha peace agreements". The actions of most political parties that involved in agreement were detrimental to possibility of achievingand sustaining peace. The delay posed in course of implementing Arusha Accord gave strength to violation based human rights was endemic and degeneration of problem of insecurity in Rwanda. It later became clear that Hutu extremists are heading on campaign aimed at complete extermination of Tutsi and few Hutu in Rwanda, which actually lead to 1994 genocide (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/historyofrwanda).

**The Preparation of Genocide**

Historians never agreed on the exact date in which it was finalized to massacre every Tutsi in Rwanda. According to prunier (1997), it is dated to 1992, when Habyarimana started his negotiation with the RPF. Melvern (2000), dated it to 1990, following initial invasion by RPF. Also, in 1990 army started giving arm to civilians like machetes and also involve in training of Hutu youth. The effect of handed over weapons to average Hutu later culminated into genocide.

Rwanda purchased good numbers of grenades from late 1990. It is also pertinent to note that Egypt under led of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as foreign minister facilitated huge sale of arms to Rwanda. The RAF) grew in strength from about

10,000 to almost 30,000 in one year. In March 1993, Hutu power started gathering lists of traitors whom they intend to kill. The list included president Habyarimaria's name, because they felt dissatisfied over president's decision and willingness to implement Arusha Agreement which would absorb Tutsi back into socio-political affairs of Rwanda (Barnett, (2002).

The Hutu extremists or the power group further condemned Radio Rwandawhich they discerned to be liberal and support opposition group. Consequently, they founded new radio station known as Radio Television libre des mille collines (RTLMC) which broadcasted a racist propaganda that is responsible for 10 percent of violence during Rwanda genocide. Furthermore in 1993, the hardliners started importation of machetes and other tools that can serve as weapons and these were distributed to Hutu supporters nationwide.

Also, assassination of Hutu president in Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye that was elected same year as first Hutu president in 1993, by extremist Tutsi forces caused shock wave which reinforced ideology among Hutu that Tutsi were their enemy and should be exterminated. As a result the Hutu people were persuaded to carry out killings (Barnett, (2002).

On January 11 1994, Romeo Dallaire sent his Genocide fax to UN headquarters which revealed discreet intent of extremist Hutu to attack Belgian peacekeepers and massacre of entire Tutsi. But this revelation suffered immense negligence by UN even while Genocide was underway. On March 20, 2017, Pope Francis accepted that while few Catholic priests in were killed during that genocide, others were involve in it and involved in planning and staging genocide (Dallaire, (2004).

**The Genocide**

On 6 April, 1994, airplane conveying Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian president Cyprien Ntaryamira was crashed by rocket attack as it was about to land in Kigali, killing all on board. This incident triggered numerous days of intense and ordered massacres. The killings of more than 1 million people severely shocked international community and were perpetrated acts of genocide. Over 150, 000 women were estimated as victims of rape. Following the president's death, the aggrieved members of presidential guard started killing Tutsi civilians

in one section of Kigali near airport. Less than half hour after plane crash, road blocks were manned by both Hutu militia groups and military personnel's with reason to fish out Tutsi.

On 7 April, a day after the president's death, "Radio Television Libres Des Mille Collines (RTLM)" aired broadcast and attributed plane crash to RPF and contingent of UN soldiers, ostensibly to exterminate entire Tutsi which they regarded as cockroaches. Later that same day, the Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Unwilingiyimana who ought to take over power and along with 10 peace keeping force from Belgian were brutally killed by Rwandan soldiers and armed civilian in attack in her home. Other Hutu leaders were equally killed. After the killing of the 10 peacekeeper from Belgium, the country quickly withdrew rest of its forces. On 21 April, other nation had equally withdrawn their forces reducing UNAMIR force drastically from 2,165 to only 270 (http://www.huffingronpost.com).

**The Aftermath of the Genocide**

The Rwandan Hutu led Government officials, soldiers and militiamen who took part in the genocide fled to DR Congo, Zaire taking along with them about 1.4 million civilians mostly from Hutu origin consequent of fear of retribution. Thousands died of poor living conditions like water-borne diseases. The camps were used by former Rwandan government army to re-arm and plan invasions in Rwanda. These attacks were what started war between Rwanda and DR Congo in 1996. It was due to incapacity of the United Nations to separate genocide leaders from refugees that caused Rwandan army to intervene militarily in October 1996 to stop that threat and allow refugees back home.

In November and December 1996 and January 1997, the greater part of refugees in Congo, Tanzania and Burundi were returned home. After few months of peace, genocidal force started guerilla war in May 1997 in North-Western part of Rwanda attacking security forces and massacring Tutsi peasants in that region. Terrorist operation continued in DR Congo spearheaded by Rwandan refugees alongside Congolese militia and other armed groups with target on Rwandan population to incite injuries and death on them (Jean-Bosco et al, cited in Adedeji, 1999). That continuation of genocide plan through guerrilla action and terrorism continued to

cost many of civilians live and obliges action both in terms of human and financial resources on other.

The Rwandan government started genocide trials in 1996. The process was delayed due to destruction of courts, prison and other infrastructure. By 2000, more than 100,000 genocide suspects were on awaiting trial. In 2001 Rwandan government commenced implementing "participatory justice system" called GA-CHA-CHA to resolve numerous cases concerning genocide. Judges were elected at community for trials of suspect of genocide who were accused of crimes not including planning and rape. While national courts were used for trying those that participated in planning or rape. The courts never allow provisional release but Gacaca courts passed lower sentences when individual repents and ask for reconciliation with community.

**United Nations Intervention**

The UN active involvement in Rwanda started in 1993, when Rwanda and Uganda requested for the deployment of military observers along common border to prevent military use of the region by the Rwandan patriotic front (RPF). In response to that request, the Security Council founded the "United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)" in the Ugandan side of the border in June 1993 with the objective of ensuring that no military assistance gets to Rwanda.

Conflict between Hutu led Government of Rwanda and Tutsi-led RPF in border axis between Rwanda and its Northern neighbor Uganda actually broke out in October 1990, and was followed by numerous armistice agreements which include the negotiated settlement reached at Arusha in Tanzania, 22 July 1992 with provision for the deployment of 50 members "Neutral Military Observer Group" 1 (NMOG 1) in Rwanda, supported by OAU and facilitated by Tanzania. The negligence over NMOG 1 and resumption of hostilities by belligerents warranted the need and call for United Nations intervention in 1993.

The diplomatic actions carried out in Arusha under the spearheading of Tanzania and OAU finally reached negotiated settlement in 1993. The terms of agreement were establishment in Rwanda leading to a broad-based transitional Government

that will incorporate both members of the belligerents, to conduct election based on the principles of democracy, repatriation of refugees and integration of the armed forces of the two parties. The quest from each side for the United Nations assistance in implementing these agreements gave rise to the replacement and expansion of NMOG 11 force, which consisted of about 130 personnel to operate on interim basis until the deployment of a Neutral International Force.

In 1993, the Security Council based on resolution 872 (1993) founded another international force, the "United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)", with the mandate of assisting parties in implementing Arusha agreement and support transitional government. NMOG 11 was absorbed into UNAMIR whose operation took effect on November 1st1993 (Dallaire, 2004).

From the onset, when UN solicited for troops, only Belgium contributed half battalion of 400 troops, followed by Bangladesh with logistical element of 400 troops. Although after barely five months, personnel strength for UNAMIR reached 2,548. Nevertheless recurring issues between disputants delayed implementing of Arusha accord and made inauguration of transitional government ineffective (Thakur, 2006).

6th April 1994 marked downing of plane that was conveying both president of Rwanda and Burundi, and of course the beginning of the genocide as it sparked wave of political and ethnic killing. Victims include prime minister, cabinet ministers, UNAMIR peacekeeper, Tutsi and few Hutus and Twa. The killingswere carried out by armed forces presidential guards and ruling party's militia youth (PARMEHUTU) and effect triggered resumption of RPF attacks from North and East of Rwanda. The interim government that was set up failed because it could not curtail massacre. Also, while the RPF continued to push southward from the North and East, the number of displaced persons and refugees increased drastically as people moved to Tanzania and Zaire (Congo) (Melvern, 2000).

UNAMIR'S effort to achieve ceasefire arrangement was to no avail. Following unilateral withdrawal of some countries contingents, UNSC by its Resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, reduced strength of UNAMIR from 2, 548 to 270. Despite

weak numerical strength, UNAMIR endeavored to protect thousands of Rwandese who took shelter at UNAMIR'S control sites.

For sake of humanity and to contribute to security of civilians, Council by resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994, authorized under chapter vii of UN charter, multinational humanitarian operation (MNHO) French led multinational forces carried out "Operation Turquoise", which established humanitarian protection zone in South Western Rwanda which is said save thousands of lives and ended its operation in August when UNAMIR took over entire zone. In mid-July, theRPF took control of Rwanda, ending civil war that had lasted 100 days, and RPF leader Paul Kagame became president and reaffirmed commitment to Arusha Accords (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/UNAMIR).

By October 1994, out of estimated population of 7.9 million, over half a million were killed. Some 2 million fled to other nations and about 2 million internally displaced. Thus, a UN humanitarian appeal launched in July raised $2 million, with objective of possibly tackling enormous humanitarian problems.

At this time, when Rwanda wanted to end UNAMIR under guise that it did not respond to its priority needs, Security Council heeded request and UNAMIR left Rwanda in March 1996. At a meeting organized by Rwanda and UN Development Program (UNDP) in 1996, international donors promised over $617 million to reconstruction of Rwanda. UN agencies have continued to provide humanitarian aid and to assist in return of refugees (Thakur, 2006).

The United Nations conflict resolution mechanisms utilized prior and during the Rwandan conflict were not efficacious to preventing and resolving conflict that transpired owing to lack of proper examination of root causes and nature of conflict between belligerents. An expert examination of conflict could have determined desirable and more effective conflict resolution mechanism to adopt in view to accomplish negotiated settlement. With this arrangement, UN intervention could have compelled parties in conflict to compromise their positions.

The United Nations did fail during Rwanda during the genocide based on the fact that UNAMIR was denied mandate and authority to unleash force through theuse of arms against the perpetrators. Consequently the peace keepers became nothing more than rubber stamp as they witnessed the genocide that transpired in Rwanda. It was also obvious that time element was one of the challenges associated with the UN intervention in the Rwandan conflict. Both the UN and Security Council members were aware of the alarming situation and did not act upon information timely and effectively until the genocide was actualized (Dallaire, 2004).

Unequivocally, what the Unite Nations would have done differently during the genocide in Rwanda was to strengthen UNAMIR's mandate and increase its numerical strength, ensure transparent negotiations which would have madeeach party shift grounds. In similar vein, it is the obligation of the major powers to actively contribute desired number of troops to UN when the need arise, but they were reluctant in the case of Rwanda, while the US isolated itself (Power, 2003).

**The Role of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)**

The United Nations Assistance mission for Rwanda could not curtail the conflict that ensued in Rwanda, therefore it is considered as a drastic failure. Also it is evident that international response to Rwandan Genocide was poor. For weeks, key power nations denied that genocidal killing was occurring in Rwanda. Even the United States refused to call such incident "genocide", in the guise that defining the term genocide would confer obligations for the US to send troops. Consequently, in July 1994, while the genocide was over, the United Nations Security Council called off the investigation of events, the upshot was the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on 8 November 1994 by adopting Resolution 955 with the grand objective to prosecute people implicated in Rwandan

The mandate of the ICTR was corporate with the Rwandan government to charge all cases that qualified, but in effect, the ICTR was not without its deficiencies. Although, crimes perpetrated by the RPF differs as compared to the degree of atrocities committed during the genocide, but it is insufficient to exclude the RPF from prosecution. For the sake of peace and true reconciliation, it is pertinent that

both parties accept their misconducts and be charged according to their actions with the aim to achieve possible remedy to resentment, feelings of hatred, and thoughts of revenge. The ICTR should be commended for its efforts to prosecute Hutu perpetrators of 1994 genocide, while it also failed to prosecute RPF who also partook in war crimes, thereby sowing the seed of potential danger.

**Conclusion**

In attempting to discuss the United Nations and conflict resolutions in the Rwandan conflict, we undertook a historical perspective. Here, we delved into history with a view to appraise and comprehend the efficacy of the plethora of techniques deployed by the United Nations before, during, and after the conflict. Tracing that from the era of the Belgian colonial administration, vis-à-vis her draconian colonial policies to the present, we were able to identify the fundamental causes (remote and immediate) of the Rwandan genocide that claimed over a million lives in 1994.

We equally identified the role of the United Nations under the umbrella of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the drama and the resultant consequences.

With these identified, workable solutions to the Rwandan conflict were proffered noting that for the Rwandan conflict to be abated, the fundamental causes of the conflict must be addressed.

Whenever the UN General Assembly has come through its conclusion and recommendations that genocide is occurring. All other UN organs and agencies like Security Council which is vested with mandate to maintain world peace should give its original legal definition as genocide and not act of genocide. State actors like U.S and others with capacity to intervene should unhesitatingly put aside national interest in pursuing global peace, human rights protection and safety to humanity. NGOs and other private parties may choose to take action in this regard as well.

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