The Ultimate Antidotes to Environmental Injustice in Nigeria: The Rational, Legal, and Natural Options

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Abstract

The foremost consequences of natural resource extraction include the environmental hazards, ethical and other legal issues pertaining to injustice. While it may be contentious and sometimes litigious as to whether the State (or any of its constitutive segments) is entitled to the revenue accruing from resources found off its shores, the aftermath and the perception of it yet by a segment may have grave consequences. This portends that while resource extraction may be inevitable, conscious and workable efforts must be made to redress the emergent social and environmental malaises. Otherwise, there will be dissent—in form of violence, destructions, kidnapping, killings, assassinations, oil-bunkering, and general insecurity—bridling such a state as a result of government insensibility to the plight of the region consequent upon state oil exploration in the region. In this situation, a certain side is aggrieved. Many radical researchers are looking back into their existing cultures and finding models and customs that can be adopted both to articulate and seek redress of the injustice, this article examined the options and indicated that an appropriate government response (rational) is human and physical development of affected communities; or the people seek legal redress. It concluded that where these have failed, however, the aggrieved party needs to look back into its nature/culture and invoke its right to freedom of self-determination and justice.

Keywords: Justice, Injustice, Environment, Self-Determination, Oath-taking

I. Introduction

The latent consequences of natural resource extraction by a state include the environmental hazards, ethical quagmire, and other legal issues pertaining to injustice. While it may be contentious and sometimes litigious as to whether a State (or any of its constitutive segments) is entitled to the revenue accruing from resources found off its shores, the aftermath and the perception of it yet by a segment may have grave consequences. This portends that while resource extraction may be inevitable, conscious and workable efforts must be made to redress the emergent social and environmental malaises. Otherwise, there will be dissent—in form of violence, destructions, kidnapping, killings, assassinations, oil-bunkering, and general insecurity—bridling such a state as a result of government insensibility to the plight of the region consequent upon state oil exploration in the region. By this, several ethical and philosophical questions are raised. Although many researchers are looking back into their existing cultures and finding models and customs that can be adopted both to suit a culturally sensitive dispute resolution or reconciliation process and to develop an effective model of social control and engineering, this article examined the options and indicated that the rational option to adopt is an appropriate government response (in form of human and physical development) to the evil consequences of resource extraction is necessary, or the people seek legal redress. It concluded that where these have failed, however, the aggrieved party needs to look back into its nature/culture and invoke its right to freedom of self-determination and justice.

Dorner and El-Shafie (1980, 23) argued that accepted definition of resources do vary substantially among disciplines. They further stated that the concept of natural resources is the one generally used by economists. But we can identify physical substances—mineral bearing ores, standing timber, crude oil, and so forth. Natural resources are not a fixed quality or quantity; it is a dynamic concept. What is however important and necessary is its capacity for usability. Thus, a resource is a pragmatic usage. Invariably, "what constitutes natural resources from the human perspective depends on the kind of knowledge and technology acquired by a society and upon human tastes, values and lifestyles." In short, what would be considered as a resource is essentially a function of the technical, managerial, and professional skills acquired by the human population involved because,

> Resources originate as useless or neutral 'stuff' existing on or in the earth and are transformed into useful substances through human knowledge. Conversely, human activity can also destroy certain resources either directly or physically as in the use of fossil minerals for fuels in the "working out" of individual metallic are deposits, or indirectly through

> technology obsolescence, such as in advances that provide an alternative resources that is more economic than or that overcomes the physical humiliations of existing resources, or both (23).

Some see resources as raw materials, which are "expendable matter or substance on which labor has been expended on its exploitation and which on further development or precisely will serve as an input in the manufacture of industrial goods and service" (Aribisala, 1993, 1). These, again, can either be primary or be secondary raw materials. Those raw materials in crude form, that is, in their natural and unprocessed form, are primary. And while all agro-based and mineral based are termed secondary raw materials–crops (cash, food, finished products), mineral, fuel, metallic and non-metallic minerals.

Again, resources can also be human. This explains the fact of frequent conflicts. No wonder that man has been a source for such since slavery days. The exercise of authority over these resources is what is termed 'resource control'. But the source of this authority sometimes is contentious and litigious. In socially stratified societies, the population is ranked in strata levels according to the distribution of principles, power, and prestige (Hobbs and Right, 1975, 155). Aristotle observed that there were three levels of society, which he called the very rich, the very poor, and all those between; he thus stratified the Greek society to his satisfaction, using wealth, income and other private criteria for making his judgment. But using the ownership of the means of production, Marx observed that Western capitalist society was stratified into two broad classes—Bourgeoisie and Proletariat, opposed to each other. Marx used the objective approach in his economic determinism. It is likely that this view influences some to believe that as a result of social stratification, resource control would be desirable.

Yet, it might be asked: What is 'control'? The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary defines 'control' as power or authority to direct, order, or limit. Control deals with ability to enforce authority (power) either directly or indirectly. It involves right to direct or make orders as regards a practical thing, or issue. For example, in Nigeria, the most common issue that is current is that of 'resources'. And going by Nigerians' interpretation of resource control, it implies the ability of any ethnic group to exercise authority to direct their God-given natural resources. For instance, a total of over 70% of Nigeria's income comes from oil revenue – which is extracted in the areas classified as minority. Consequently, these minorities are agitating for a better deal in the sharing of the income so that the areas that produce mineral resources could control the resources. Fortunately, resource goes beyond crude oil—it includes land/water, labor, industrial/manufacturing, and infrastructural resources.

Justice/injustice Most generally, justice implies giving each person or group of persons his or their due, and the quality of being fair to others. Justice has legal, distributive, political, environmental and social strands. The term, justice has its roots in the Latin word, *justus*, which means the quality of being *just*, fair or impartial. It means even-handedness and adherence to truth or fact and the rendering of what is due or merited to ones-self and others. It also means conformity to right principles with honesty and integrity (Webster, 1978). Among the ancient Romans, for example, *jus* was also a precept of law which implies "to live honorably, not hurt one another, to give each man his due." According to Curson (1966, 14), it could mean "a place where justice is dispensed (*jus vocation*)", or "general, man-made law as opposed to *fas*, that is, law declared by divine authority". From the foregoing *jus* came to have particularly important meanings; (a) the rules of law, and (b) the rights conferred by those rules on a person in particular situations. The Roman word for justice, *acquitas*, means "fairness…." Ulpian, the Roman jurist defined justice as *suum cuique tribuere*, i. e. "the constant and perceptive wish to give each man his due" (Curson, 14). In the words of Grisez, (1979, 180) "justice requires due respect for liberty which, while itself is not one of the basic human goods, is a necessary condition for the active human realization of any of those goods." Justice cannot be realized outside a system of Law and its institutions. It is a system in which law is a vital aspect of man's culture and social existence; embodying the collective will of the community and binding its members in a unity of purpose amidst the essentiality of the exercise of reason. Thus, justice could mean the ultimate telling/determination of truth, fair or correct application of rules, distribution of goods/services, allocation of roles/duties, rewards and punishments. Hence to Aristotle, justice is the first virtue of every society and, as stressed by Sadurski (1985, 12), "it is the most important virtue displayed by a society." Girson (1967) contends that justice is not only the virtue results in each person receiving his or her due, but that it is also the quality of being right and fair. But Aristotle institutionalizes the conception of justice, that it is the kind of state character which makes people act justly and wish for what is just. Tom Campbell (1988, 1) sees justice as normally the language of complaint and sometimes of revenge, considering cases of perceived injustice. Justice could connote utilitarian principles—the greatest happiness principle. "Actions are right in proportion they tend to promote happiness, wrong as tend to produce the reverse of happiness…." (Mill, 6; Bentham, 1970, 527). According to Dworkin (1977, 84), "the possession of rights enhances the dignity of the right holders." Thus this has a legal association with justice as such infringements could only be redressed by a properly constituted court (of justice). *Desert* is another approach to justice.

However, underlying these approaches are the ideas of freedom, morality and equality. Roggers (1922, 181-195) is probably right when he asserts that justice is in respect a tool for

securing what is desired. Succinctly put, when we say a society is just, we judge believing such to be free, informed and rational, committed to a respect for the good life. Remarkably, it is here proposed that to achieve development, one must recognize justice as an ideal which attainment requires equality and fairness amidst a reflection a people's socio-historical background. Regrettably in Africa (as indicated in the Nigerian experience), there is neither development nor freedom of the people of Niger-Delta because there are no elements of both negative and positive freedom (Berlin, 1983). This ought not to be the case. As has been described in the Niger-Delta example, the idea of justice does not end with the social and political, but importantly connotes cultural, psychological, environmental and ethical features/nature. However, all forms of environmental injustice (i.e. injustices arising from State's non-responsiveness to the plight of a people arising from its extractive activity) could be redressed in one or several of the following options.

II. Resources exploit activity as basic cause of environmental depletion in Nigeria

For the avoidance of doubt, resource exploit, especially in the Delta region of Nigeria, has resulted to lack of agricultural activity in the area, impossibility of actualizing private potentials, pollution of the air (with its health implications), distraction to the citizens (thereby having a psychological toll on them. All these have their toll on social order. Since the discovery of oil in Nigeria in the 1950s, there has been steady agitation for more government care for the life of those directly affected by the extractive activity; and it has been on the rise. Some prominent activists from the region have paid the supreme sacrifice. Yet, agitations for redress continue; and fortunately, all forms of infamy and injustice of environmental hazard could be redressed—directly or indirectly; willing or agitated. Towards achieving this, three options contend.

a. The rational option: Infrastructural development/service rendering

An appropriate discussion to this option is possible only after a clear understanding of the concept of development. Development implies advancement and growth in any organized states, not merely quantitative but also in qualitative terms: establishment of structures, building of attitudes, institutions—economic, social, political, religious, and legal. Under-development is the absence of these. Development is positive in nature. In some sense, development implies a comparative state of affairs: between past state of the same society, or between two or more societies—a matter of per capita income. Development is also a "strategy of spatial reorganization crucial for the whole process of political mobilization and central state control of the planning of productive forces, not necessarily centralized at just a point" (n.i. 1994). This means that development is the exploitation of nature, education, human capacity for social up-lift. Thus human development connotes

enhancement of man's thought and rationality, purity, and being; the moral uprightness of individuals. A society of moral individuals already is one with a good foundation for infrastructural development—involving the provision of amenities, services, and other physical and technological structures for man's use. Whether in human or infrastructural aspects, the aim of development is utilitarian: to provide man with basic necessities of life (food, shelter, clothing, security, etc); to free man from all forms of human misery, ignorance, servitude, and dependence. Hence purposive national development plan must reflect those ideals. This is lacked in Africa—from Nigeria and Niger-Delta, to South Africa's hinterland of Soweto, Ghana's gold coast, and to Libyan oil-rich communities. Thus in as much as the crumb of resource-extracting activity in Africa is not adjusted to meet these standards, underdevelopment holds sway and it has become a crisis.

It is a crisis because development is "a rise in the standard of living of a people...a progressive elimination of poverty, unemployment, social inequalities, authoritarian political structures…" (Uroh, 1998, 1-2). According to Claude Ake (1999), "…alienations, resentment, inefficiency, and corruption" are manifestations of underdevelopment. Yet any successful scheme must also reflect the very historical values and practices of the particular society. Ake further holds that all the African countries that are supposed to be sponsoring NEPAD have been adjudged very corrupt by Corruption Perception Index (CPI) survey of 2002, Nigeria, Madagascar, Kenya, South Africa, Senegal, Egypt, Angola are all wallowing in corrupt practices.

It could be said that imperialism/colonialism is the cause of underdevelopment in Africa. But it is common knowledge that is not all African states that emerged from colonialism. Marxists hold that every state of society is a historical phase in the history of such society. But some societies under capitalism have developed without revolution. Modernization theorists would want us believe that development comes naturally, a product of handwork, and that traditional social structures (such as kinship, ethnicity, extended family, superstition, etc) hinder it; yet there still are those who hold that development is a product of historical and political evolution. Thus none of these theories can wholly account for the continuing underdevelopment in Africa. There still is hunger, want, insecurity. Lack of social amenities, infrastructures, corruption and injustice are a bane to the achievement of development in Africa. This is a denial of social and economic rights of the people (as against the UN Covenants). And although the idea of universal right implies the idea of universal duty and economic and social rights lack this duty, it could be said that since state resource is gotten from somewhere, it is only expedient that resource be used to the favor of such place and its occupants (who have thus earned the right); this is

a state obligation. One problem with this approach is the problem of corruption. But this could be countered by accurate accountability and oath-practice.

Broadly speaking, accountability is an ethical concept with several meanings. Often, it is used synonymously with such other concepts as answerability, enforcement, blameworthiness, liability and other terms associated with the expectation of account-giving and individual/social responsibility. As an aspect of governance or responsibility, it has been central to discussions related to problems in both the public and private (corporation) worlds. Accordingly, there is sanction in the case of eventual misconduct. Accountability is described as "A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A's (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them…." The word "accountability" stems from the Latin *accomptare* (to account), a prefixed form of *computare* (to calculate), which in turn derived from *putare,* to reckon (Oxford, 2007). Usefully, high accountability standard constrains the extent to which elected representatives and other office-holders can willfully deviate from their theoretical responsibilities, thus reducing corruption.

b. The natural option: Traditional oath-practice

One effective remedy to injustice and corruption in Africa is the institution of oath-taking (Asekhauno, 2006). Oath is "a ritualistic declaration, as by appeal to God, that one will speak the truth, *and* keep a promise…" (Webster, 1978). It is a sworn statement as to the truthfulness of what is said or that a person will or will not do a certain thing; it frequently involves an appeal to a superior (Web, 2009). Another term for it is *'a-lah'*, meaning "oath, cursing"—threat of calamity in case of misdeed). So, among the earliest societies, oath was in a sense more of a religious act, involving deities and God. Generally, this act could be performed in making a promise, or in seeking justice. Oath is a formal promise to do something or a formal statement that something is true; a solemn and faithful promise to act in some way and not otherwise. It is pledge or undertaken, a kind of voluntary self submission to some responsibility if one act contrary to such pledge. These definitions imply that oath is some sort of faith which implies to be believed, to believe somebody and to believe something, not mere amorphous contiguity. In Africa, for example, every aspect of reality is believed to have been brought or made so by some deity or ancestor or force, hence individual wellbeing and social cohesion was/is ultimately achieved by recourse to those forces (Web, 2009).

Thus, oath and oath-practice is an ancient practice with modern significance. Today, all nations of the world and any association of leadership impute some article expressive of some allegiance, and most times more obvious in stipulating oath. For example, by virtue of the Seventh schedule of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution, oath-taking/oath of allegiance

is provided for, and once sworn to any, it's a promise not to act contrary to a promise. Thus for our present research, the term, oath (ancient or modern) means allegiance, promise, swearing, covenant, using any symbol of faith for sakes of telling the truth, in other words, to be under some swearing, a practical and applicative activity involving also social and spiritual connotations. African traditional oath is efficacious, and its justice is either instant or assured; and the role of the Jury is simply administrative and application of the law (Asekhauno, 2006), it has the practical force necessary and needed to assure justice, which man (left alone as mortal) cannot ensure. And this is a vital role. Hence there are two considerations in the contemplation of justice, legal and moral/ethical considerations. Legality itself is or ought to be a fortification or enforcer of moral codes, to enhance conformity and sanction deviance. So, legality though is an aspect of it, complements morality. Prosecution and defense are matters of logical argumentation, validity; they hardly can be predicated on *actual truth, soundness.* But whatever it is, the courts only appreciate logical truths and since there is more to truth than logicality, there must be a way of determining the whole truth. This, we think, is the idea behind oath-taking. In the present dispensation, some truth is suppressed in the face of logical superiority and this is not healthy. Determining this aspect of truth ought to be the sole goal of oath. Following this analogy, *oath* needs to be efficacious and it should be the sole test for usefulness, relevance and need for oath-taking, and administration of justice. Formal oath-practice in Africa today is alien to Africa, and it has not proved its desired relevance; it lacks efficacy. This is a major problem with the legal option.

c. The moral-legal option: Reparation, resource control/self-determination

Many have argued that reparation or indemnity be paid to the victims of resource extraction in Nigeria. Such agitations have suffered setback because it has ignited several agitations in other quarters around the country. Thus the people may adopt another approach—quest for total freedom pursuant to the principle of self-determination.

In "Right to self-Determination", Uroh (1995) pointed out that the atomistic right to self determination is an inalienable right granted by nature which the state has no right to interfere with but can only defend; that for the purpose of political struggle which amplified the social nature of man, there is a need to urge individual interest to give rise to the formidable force of group-struggle for self determination. But as a political doctrine, the history of right to self-determination dates back to the 16th and 17th century French Revolutions. It was them viewed that, contrary to the hitherto popular view that political authority has a divine origin and that the people were born either with divine mission to rule or be ruled; but rather that men are born, and always continue, free, equal in all respect of their rights (Paine, 1983, 31). These rights, which were later affirmed by proponents of

the American Declaration, include those to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The essence of these rights, especially that to liberty, is that people are entitled to freely determine, either by themselves or by privy, the ways the affairs of their lives are to be conducted. The implication of this is that no state has the power grant these rights because they were held by the people even before the very state came to existence. These were the rights political philosophers proclaimed were written in the hearts and minds of every individual. Peck (1990, 34) posits that "….kings and governors were powerless in this regard; they cannot deny the people these rights of liberty and social freedom". But suffice it to note that the image of the person in the foregoing Declaration is rather atomistic in contradistinction to persons perceived as members of social groups or communities bound together by a feeling of group solidarity. Yet this article is interested in the person as a social being whose potentials can hardly be achieved without others. Of course this position commits us into affirming a group dimension to rights generally and, by implication, the rights to self-determination. The group dimension of the rights issue generally "involves the human personality as identified and formed by group membership, by inter-group relations, and the status of the group within the society or region as a whole" (Nyerere, 1990). But this conception differs from that which treats people as abstract individuals with rights that are supposedly inalienable. The group dimension to the right discourse treats right rather as belonging to people by virtue of their membership of some social groups or communities. When conceived in this way, group rights can be broadly categorized into three.

Political rights are those which a people of an identified group are entitled to internal self-government; socio-economic rights which entitles a groups to enjoy collective property rights, including that to participate in joint decision making concerning development and exploitation making concerning development and exploitation of resources in the areas occupies by the groups; and cultural rights which includes the right to speak one's language wear cultural dresses and take part in cultural activities. The ideas of self-determination within the framework of the group dimension of rights as conceived above would then mean that any identified group would enjoy the three rights just identified, without undue inhibition.

Obviously, or less so, the above concepts, believed to be the spirit behind the provision of Article 1 (i) of the *1966 International Covenant* to the effect that: "All people have the right to self determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" (Buchanen, 1995, 588). The question is, what actually constitutes 'people' in the above declaration? And by this, the question of who is entitled to enjoy the right to self-determination has become a

contentious one. For instance, Robert Lasing, the secretary to President Woodrow Wilson, would not subscribe to the view that people of all nations are here included; that all races are entitled to the enforcement of right of people to self-determination. He posits:

> The more I think …, the more convicted I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the peace conference and create trouble in many lands…, will it not breed discontent, disorder, and rebellion? (Buchanen, 589).

Remarkably, the ground for this limited conception of the right to self-determination is the fear that its enforcement among some people may lead to state disintegration rather than social integration. Yet it is, ironically, affirmed, on the same ground of fear of its social-disintegration potential, by both the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU, now AU—African Union). For the two international bodies, the right to self –determination applies to non-self governing territories only. Ought it to be that once a territory becomes self-governing, the embodying peoples' right to self determination is exhausted?

The 1970 Declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states insists that:

> …states enjoying full sovereignty and independence, and possessed of a government effectively representing the whole of the population, shall be considered to be conducting themselves in conformity with the principle of equal right and self-determination of peoples as regards their population (Shivji 1996, 6).

However, by thus *limiting* the right to self-determination, the various nationalities within an existing state are denied the right to self-determination so long as their states remain self-governing. It is perhaps understandable why African leaders had to accept this conception of the right to self-determination regarding the unfounded fear through of the disintegration of their new/post-colonial states. This is evident on the pressure they mounted on the UN General Assembly to adopt the resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960 which inter alia states that "any attempt aimed at the partial or total destruction of national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN" (Donnelly 1989, 148). Here, the fears of secession by states on one hand, and governments' fear of revolution, on the other, combine to restrict

the right to self-determination to little more than a right to sovereignty for these states. The meaning/application of the term, "struggle" is beyond guerrilla warfare and other forms of violence cum armed struggle. The word, in its full application can also be subtle, non-violent and can be pursued via constitutional means.

By implication, the fear magnified in the above resolution may not only be detrimental to the harmonious coexistence of the various social-cultural groups in Africa, but, more importantly it is born out of a misrepresentation of the idea of a nation or people. Also, the implication of both the UN and the OAU/AU positions on the right of a people (nation) to self-determination is that any group of people who, by accident of history, as it is the case with most African states, are brought together under one government irrespective of how this government was brought about or how it is presently constituted, is a state. But a nation is more than just that. It is essentially a particular type of cultural community.

Two facts (or points?) may be agreeable: one, that a set of objective facts that could be taken as the necessary and sufficient conditions for drawing the boundaries of nations and/or nationalities (marking one from others) may be difficult to ascertain; and two, that nationalism is, in the final analysis, a matter of a particular people's feelings or perception of themselves—feelings or perceptions which they believe mark them off from others. Therefore, a sense of solidarity is important in the identification of nation. In this circumstance, it could be affirmed that "any territorial community whose members… and wish to maintain the identity is a nation" (Coban,1990,167).

Following the above line of reasoning, a nation obtains "when individuals are able to recognize each other as members and come to believe that their membership carries with it special mutual responsibilities" (Tamir, 1991, 576). But if we accept mutual recognition and exclusion as being very important in the formation of a nation, then, it is only a particular people and not the least any outsider who could identify or affirm themselves as belonging to the same nation.

By implication, the idea of right to self-determination would mean the right which a people have to preserve their national life. The principal element here is the equality of all peoples and nations; it is never social disintegration. This being the case, the demand for self determination should be seen not as a quest for the dismemberment of the state, but rather, as a demand for a greater autonomy through the achievement of limited rights of self-government as distinct sub-units within the state. In other words, what the movement for self-determination demands is not the dismemberment of a 'present' state, but only a reallocation of certain powers within the state. This boils down to the fact that to ensure

the enjoyment of the right to self-determination, especially within the context of the plural states of Africa, there should be a constitutional guarantee for a people who feel themselves linked by some special form resulting from their sharing in the same history, tradition, culture, and perhaps, geographical contiguity, amongst others; to have unrestrained enforcement of their political, economic and cultural rights.

From the preceding arguments, it should be noted that the struggle for self-determination at either group or atomistic level is preempted by perceived or real injustice, oppression, domination and repression. However, the claim of prevalence of justice, equity and fairness cannot completely eliminate the struggle for self-determination but can only go a long way to reduce it. In an egalitarian society, struggle for self-determination can be donated for more reason of cultural solidarity or other fraternal or historical reasons.

III. Conclusion

The injustices done to the environment and peoples where heavy resource extraction happens is both palpable and appalling. According to Camara (1971),

> No one is born to be a slave. No one seeks to suffer injustices, humiliations and restrictions. A human being condemned to sub-human situation is like an animal; an ox, or a donkey; wallowing in the mud. Now the egoism of some privileged groups drives countless human beings into this sub-human condition, where they suffer restrictions, humiliations, injustices; without prospects, without hope, their condition is that of slaves.

Again, Camara gave an apt illustration of the vicious nature of injustice and its far-reaching consequences on social order, peace and stability. Camara was thus able to learn through experience that the violence of revolt, which more often than not, attracts our attention and moral outrage, has a root which is embedded in the structure of the society. The real root of violence is injustice, which he calls violence no 1. Whenever the heat of this basic form of violence, this violence of injustice, this violence no 1, becomes too intensive, too oppressive, and too unbearable, it explodes in revolt, which he called violence no 2 (Camara, 34/55). But violence is expression of injustice.

In Africa, respective government dealings or efforts to 'make whole' do not ever meet any principle of justice—of right, utility, dessert, happiness, fairness, liberty, *et cetera*. They have simply been oppressive. And 'resistance to oppression' is one of the 'natural and imprescriptible rights' of man. It means the right to resist oppression. What is oppression besides power misapplied to the prejudice of some individual or a group? When it applies

to resource tapping by the state, suffering (a condition they ought not to have been subjected) resulting from the evil consequences of environmental depletion. This is the bases for resistance in form of legal action to seek reparation and quest for resource-control, or the employment of affirmative action, or the invocation of the principle of self-determination. The subtlety or exigency of a peculiar situation determines the necessary tool of redress to be employed. This however includes the option of applying all the options outlined in their expedient-logical necessity, or several at once. But before such happens, it should be recognized that, as Aristotle taught, one does not become just merely by abstractly knowing what Justice is; rather, one becomes just by doing just things. Accordingly, since the problem of determining both in definition and practical application of justice, equity and fairness is one string factor against the elimination of the struggle for self-determination (as the ultimate option), peoples suffering from all manner of environmental injustice as a result of resource-tapping from their environment are urged not to submit to any decree or act of power, of the justice of which they are not themselves perfectly convinced.

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